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Abstract: This thesis seeks to discover the conditions legitimizing political violence by exploring
the Sri Lankan Civil War and then pairing the derived principle with theoretical justifications of
violence, including just war theory. While many attest that the radically violent means employed
by the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam throughout the war were immoral and inexcusable acts
ofterrorism, this claim too quickly discredits their motives without due consideration, thus
unfairly detractingfrom the legitimacy of their cause. I hope to show the fault in this tendency,
both in the context of the Sri Lanka and in more general terms. Political violence is a dramatic
course ofaction, but that does not mean it is never necessary or legitimate. An analysis of
political conditions for both Tamils and Sinhalese in the five years since the end of the civil war
demonstrates the regime's continued disregard for human rights. By reducing the LITE to a
terrorist organization, the Rajapaska regime has been able to avoid addressing the legitimate
grievances presented by Tamils. While this has not yet caused substantial violence to resurface,
the increasingly authoritarian regime is on thin ice, both with Tamils and Sinhalese as well as
the international community.

Introduction:

The year is 1983, and while Lech Walesa, a prominent figure in the worker's solidarity
movement in the Soviet Block and future president of Poland, receives the Nobel Peace Prize for
his human rights work, naked and humiliated Tamils are burned alive in Sri Lanka by multitudes
of disgruntled Sinhalese. While President Reagan defends the United States' practice of
supplying aid to the Contras in Nicaragua, terrified Tamils fled their homes in Sri Lanka seeking
political refuge in India and other nearby countries. While Dr. Issarn Sarawi is assassinated by a
faction ofhis own organization, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which he believed could
help foster peace between Palestinians and Israelis, infuriated Tamil youths watched the murder
of their friends and family, lucky themselves to have escaped the physical reality of the vicious,
state-sponsored anti-Tamil riots, but still victim to their nefarious psychological effects. Being
witness to such blatant disregard for the lives of fellow Tamils-fellow human beings-further
intensified the disunity between Tamils and Sinhalese, pushing many Tamils to believe that
Eelam, the realization ofthe Tamils' historical right to the island of Sri Lanka, was the only
realistic way for peace on the island to be achieved. The events of"Black July," as these anti-
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Tamil riots have collectively come to be known, pushed thousands of Tamils who had previously
believed peace and equality within a unitary state was attainable to discard these dogmas.
Instead, even moderate Tamils came to support the creation of Tamil Eelam, an independent state
grounded in the belief that Tamils retain a historical right to the island as its first inhabitants,
with Tamil kingdoms in Jaffua predating even Athens' 5th century "golden age." Unwilling to
endure the subjugation that had plagued them for decades, Tamils came to embrace Eelam and
endorse whatever means were necessary to end the reprehensible violence being carried out
against their friends, neighbors, and perfect strangers solely on the basis of ethnicity.
While some Tamils could not escape the events of Black July with their lives and others
decided to flee, a comparatively few courageous men and women chose to fiercely defend their
innate human rights against state-sponsored violence and oppression. Black July led to the
expansion, restructuring and fortification of numerous radical Tamil groups, most notably the
Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LITE). In response, the Sinhalese-dominated state
strengthened their armed forces to defend and retaliate against the violence being utilized by the
LTIE. This was the beginning of an ethnic civil war that would last nearly three decades, with
inequality, state-sponsored violence, and authoritarianism outlasting the war's end. There is a
general consensus among modem political theorists that political violence, in this case the arson,
assassinations, and suicide bombings carried out by the LTIE during the civil war, amounts to
nothing more than senseless acts of terrorism-immoral taboo that contributes to the ultimate
failure of ethnic minorities to obtain independence. Indeed, many prominent politicians and
political scientists, including Neil DeVotta, Cecile Van de Voorde, and Canadian cabinet
minister Stockwell Day, have condemned the LTTE for their violent attempts to realize Tamil

Ee/am, claiming their focus on the annihilation of their oppressors prevented them from
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producing the necessary elements of statehood (DeVotta 2009: 1021 ) . Throughout the Sri
Lankan Civil War, the international community largely prescribed to this view, with many
countries, including the United States, designating the LITE " . .. the most dangerous and deadly
extremists in the world," ("Taming the Tamil Tigers" 2008: 1). The Sri Lankan state purported
this view on the international stage, with state-run media professing" ... LTTE terrorists carried
out some of the most brutal bomb attacks and massacred Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim civilians
during their three decades ofterror," ("Atrocities by LITE Terrorists" 2014: 1).
The Argument for Legitimacy:
Yet, such staunch opposition to political violence too quickly discredits and minimizes
the legitimacy of the grievances brought by the Tamil people and provides unqualified
justification for the violent methods utilized by the state as they attempted to eradicate the LTIE.
To vilifY the men and women who were unwilling to lay dormant in the face of injustice is to
breathe legitimacy into the endeavors of their oppressors. Additionally, it fails to consider the
circumstances under which the L TIE carried out these violent acts. By contextualizing the
violence committed by the LITE during the Sri Lankan Civil War, this study seeks to determine
when, if ever, politically motivated violence is justified and legitimate. As the Sri Lankan Civil
War resonates among numerous ethnic minorities as they struggle against their majority
oppressors, the specific principles derived from this case study are broadly applicable .
Ultimately, it seems there are certain conditions which warrant a resort to political violence as a
legitimate means of revolution, notably when grievances are intolerable and cannot be overcome
via conventional, nonviolent means. This principle is then applied beyond the limited empirical
scope of the Sri Lankan Civil War in order to offer a theoretical defense of political violence.
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Reviewing the political state of Sri Lanka prior to the creation of the LTIE and the
beginning of the civil war, as well as the Marxist roots of the organization's leaders, brings us to
ar, understanding of why many Tamils believed radicalism was necessary to ensure their survival
within Sri Lanka. However, the ultimate goals ofthe LTTE, and even many non-violent political
groups such as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), must also be considered in order to
fully understand their resort to political violence: Peaceful coexistence within a unitary state was
seen as an outlandish notion given the increasing subjugation ofTamils. The LTTE and the
TULF believed Tamil Eelam was not only essential to allow for the self-determination of the
Tamil people, but also a historical right (Spencer 1990: 9). With an appreciation for the
grievances presented by Tamils as well as an understanding of what was believed to be a fair and
viable solution to these problems, the major events of the Sri Lankan Civil War can be
thoughtfully examined, showing the relative success and failures of both the LTIE and the state.
This will lead us to an understanding ofthe seemingly abrupt end ofthe war and the defeat ofthe
LITE. This historical background, which is necessary in order to grasp the effects of political
violence and, under appropriate circumstances, justify its use, brings us to modem Sri Lanka.
Surely, nearly thirty years of violence has had a profound effect on both the people and
politics of Sri Lanka. It is impossible to garner an understanding ofthe importance of political
violence without examining its consequences, both for Tamils and Sinhalese, currently living in
Sri Lanka. The end of the war has not meant equality or peace for Tamils. While some pockets of
resistance to the dictatorial regime do occasionally arise, they are quickly squashed without
much struggle. In the five years since the end of the civil war (a relatively short period) Sri
Lanka has seen increasing political corruption and militarization under the regime of Mahinda
Rajapaksa, primarily in the country's northern region. Tamil journalists and activists who
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attempt to draw attention to the continued suppression of their people are frequently
"disappeared," and, despite repeated requests from the United Nations, including the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, the regime refuses to investigate accusations of
war crimes during the civil war (Stone 2014: 153). Instead, Rajapaksa has focused on
centralizing power within his family and diminishing any resistance to this practice that could be
presented by the judiciary or provincial councils.
While it may seem, then, that the violence carried out by the LTIE was futile, and some
academics, such as DeVotta, may even claim that it was the violence ofthe LTIE that facilitated
the state's reliance on increased authoritarianism, this is not the case (DeVotta 2009: 1024). Had
the LTIE not taken up arms, it is nearly certain that the Sinhalese-controlled Sri Lankan state
~·ould

have continued to marginalize Tamils and eliminate any semblance of political autonomy

and equality they have retained, leaving them far worse off than they are today. Additionally, to
suggest that the state's dictatorial practices are due to the violence of the civil war and exist to
prevent the return of such violence is to provide undue justification for what is nothing more than
blatant disregard for the natural human rights of man as well as Rajapaksa's yearning for power.
Thus, we must consider the theoretical justification for the actions of the LTIE as well as similar
revolutionary movements.
The case of the LITE and the Sri Lankan Civil War can be used as the pragmatic
foundation for a more theoretical look at political violence. While it is both empirically and
morally wrong to say that political violence is always a viable or necessary solution to injustice,
it is just as irrational to claim that it is never worthwhile. Of course, the legitimacy of political
violence is perceived differently by ethicists and theorists depending on whether they prescribe
to a consequential or deontological moral framework. Consequentially, although it is often a
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costly route to pursue wrought with its own drawbacks, such as the unfortunate delegitimizing of
the concerns of the oppressed or the sacrifice of civilians, political violence is sometimes
justified in order to prevent greater harm from being committed. Of course, it is possible to
reduce such unintended consequences, and such precautions should be taken whenever possible.
This principle is consistent with a modern interpretation of the fundamental elements ofjust war
theory as well as various principles purported by well-respected political theorists including
Barrington Moore, Noam Chomsky and Conor Cruise O'Brien (Chomsky 1967: 1).
From a deontological perspective, the legitimacy of political violence is far more
subjective and thus harder to gauge. However, the works of academics such as Conor Cruise
O'Brien do make a strong moral argument for the use of violence, particularly when assessing
the justification ofviolence against oppressors (Chomsky 1967: 1). Moreover, it can be seen as
immoral to allow for the persecution of innocent parties when there exists an opportunity to
prevent their suffering. The LITE chose to seize this opportunity. Subjugation ofTamils had
become an increasingly common practice in the years leading up to the civil war. Tamils were
being forced to the margins of society and exterminated by the state, and there existed no
indication that the state planned to reverse its century-long discriminatory practices; rather, they
were intensifying. The Tamil people had been backed into a corner. The actions ofthe LITE
drew attention to horrendous wrongdoings being carried out against an entire ethnicity in a
distant corner of the third world that had long been, and still remains, overlooked by the
international community. As such, it is suggested that the political community reconsider its
brash, blanket condemnation of political violence and instead gives due consideration to the
potential benefits and legitimacy of politically motivated acts of violence. Ultimately, political
violence is both legitimate and justifiable when grievances have become intolerable and cannot
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be overcome through the use of conventional, nonviolent means. Although it is surely
accompanied by several serious drawbacks, its benefits are not so insignificant as to warrant its
dismissal as practicable action. Moreover, it may offer additional benefits, such as aiding the
process of state-building, as discussed by YouseffCohen in The Paradoxical Nature of

Statemaking. These additional potential benefits will be briefly discussed at the end of this work.

A Colonial History:
The conflict between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority has strong
anthropological roots that time, war, and violence have thus far failed to sever, largely arising
from contradictory beliefs between the two populations regarding the island' s mythological
history. Summarily, the Sinhalese believe that Sri Lanka exists as a home for Sinhalese
Buddhists alone, as it was entrusted to Sakka, the king of Buddhist gods, by Buddha himself
(Spencer 1990: 4). This belief stands in stark contradiction to Tamil claims of Eelam-the belief
that Tamils were the first inhabitants of Sri Lanka, having established kingdoms there, such as
the northern kingdom of Jaffua, as early as the 61h century BC, and thus retain a historical right to
the island. Eelam has come to mean "belonging to the Tamils," and Tamils do believe the
n0rthem and eastern regions of Sri Lanka are rightfully theirs (Seevaratnam 1989: 58).
Interestingly, and surely not out of coincidence, the borders drawn by the LTIE and other
separatists distinguishing the Tamil homeland from the rest of Sri Lanka follow exactly the
borders contrived under British colonialism in an attempt to respect the linguistic and cultural
differences between Tamils and Sinhalese (Spencer 1990: 28). Thus, it is believed by historians
and anthropologists that much ofthe conflict in the country is the result of somewhat superficial
culonial distinction between the two groups rather than ancient conflict. It is probable that both
groups lived peacefully on the island until Europeans arrived in the 161h century (Bose 1994: 47).
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While the destructive effects of colonialism are a matter beyond the scope of this work, the
colonial history of Sri Lanka does require consideration in order to understand the modem ethnic
conflict.
When Portuguese colonizers first arrived in Sri Lanka in 1505 the island was divided into
three kingdoms--one Tamil kingdom which controlled the entire north and east of the country
and two Sinhalese kingdoms presiding over the southern and western regions (Bose 1994: 48).
The island was passed from the Portuguese to the Dutch and finally the British in the late 18th
century. For the British colonizers and their predecessors, leaving the island divided into three
separate kingdoms was impractical, and, during this time, political philosophy was focused on
peaceful coexistence between united ethnicities, made possible by respecting cultural differences
and providing equal treatment to varying groups. This Enlightenment thinking caused the British
to emphasize the relatively slight cultural and religious differences between the two ethnicities in
an attempt to respect and protect these minor dissimilarities. They implemented unitary rule over
the island, forcing together the three distinct kingdoms, while still attempting to respect the
cultural differences between the Tamils and Sinhalese. Unfortunately, the British focus on
liberalism exemplified differences rather than drawing them together under a unitary
government, consequently exacerbating tensions between the groups (Stone 1990: 27-31).
Additionally, as they sought to expand economic opportunities in Sri Lanka, the British moved
many Tamils from Tamil Nadu, in southern India, to Sri Lanka. As workers on tea, tobacco, and
coffee plantations in the country, these Tamils, about 10% ofthe total population of Sri Lanka
and about 50% ofthe island's Tamil population, were forced into a life of indentured servitude
and formed the lower caste of Sri Lankan society (Manogaran 1994: 5). As many of these
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plantations existed in primarily Sinhalese regions, many Tamils were transported to these areas,
creating opportunities for conflict.
Thus, it is clear that the struggle of the Tamil people against oppression predates Sri
Lankan independence by over 100 years. However, it is sometimes argued by scholars, such as
Patrick Peebles and Donald Horowitz, that the Tamils were actually favored under British rule
(Peebles 1990: 32). Indeed, because many Tamils from Jaffua were able to speak English thanks
to teachings from American Christian missionaries operating on the Jaffua peninsula, they were
often better qualified for employment in public service than many Sinhalese (Horowitz 1985:
156). The Tamils, then, were not favored for subjective ethnic reasons, but rather because of
their linguistic skills: Sinhalese were afforded the same opportunities for employment if they
could demonstrate competency in English. Unfortunately, in the southern regions of Sri Lanka,
where most Sinhalese lived, British ministries were the primary English teaching institutions,
and they were simply not as successful as their American counterparts operating in the north
(Bose 1994: 49). While this advantage did cause disproportionate representation ofTamils in
pasitions of public service, it is important to remember that the majority of Tamils remained
subjugated in indentured servitude: about 50% of the island's Tamil population. This was not
true ofthe Sinhalese, who made up about 74% ofthe island's total population but less than 1%
ofthe plantation servants (Manogaran 1994: 5). Moreover, political representation throughout
the colonial period was generally equitably divided among Sinhalese and Tamils, with the British
delegating one Sinhalese, one Tamil, and one Burgher as legislative representatives to the British
governor. However, in the early 20th century, political representation came to favor the
Sinhalese, as it was bifurcated between elected and nominated officials. While the British
government remained impartial in its nominations (two Sinhalese, two Tamils, one Muslim and
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one Kandyan), 34 representatives were elected, thus giving a political advantage to the
majoritarian race, the Sinhalese (Spencer 1990: 26-30). Accordingly, while some preliminary
evidence may suggest that British colonizers offered preferential treatment to Tamils, these
claims are shortsighted.

Engendering Animosity:
Partiality towards the Sinhalese majority has outlived colonial rule on the island: When
Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948, conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese did not cease.
Rather, it intensified with the passage of exclusionary laws, such as the Ceylon Citizenship Act
of 1948. This law denied citizenship to over one million Sri Lankan Tamils oflndian descent,
about 11% of the population, making them stateless, disenfranchised, and lacking political
representation within the government. Interestingly, there was little obvious outrage among
Tamils when this law passed in parliament. However, one prominent politician, S.J.V.
Chelvanayakam, feared that these encroaching injustices would soon befall Sri Lanka Tamils as
well. Thus, he began the Tamil Federal Party, which initially fought for regional autonomy for
Tamils via a federal system and presented a substantial challenge to state authoritarianism for
decades to come (Bose 1994: 53-4). Certainly, Chelvanayakam's prediction was right-disputes
over representation within the infantile government continued to be a prominent source of
conflict. In 1956, the Sinhala Only Act was passed, making Sinhala the only official language of
Sri Lanka. As such, all government employees had to prove proficiency in Sinhalese, making it
incredibly difficult for Tamils, about 20% of the total population, to retain and obtain
government employment. This law effectively enabled the Sinhalese to take control of many
political offices without fear of competition from Tamils (Stone 2014: 147). The state has also
historically attempted to tip the political scales in favor of the Sinhalese by resettling large

lee 13

Sinhalese populations to traditionally Tamil regions, thus altering demographics in order to
obtain the majority of votes in regional elections. One such resettlement of Sinhalese families to
the eastern province of Amparai in 1956 led to violent riots initiated by the new settlers, leaving
over 150 Tamils dead (Bose 1994: 60). While conditions for Tamils worsened, Chelvanayakam
gained popularity among Tamils as he attempted to reverse discriminatory policies. However,
any concessions he was able to receive proved ultimately disastrous for Tamils: When Prime
Minister Bandaranaike agreed to consider returning citizenship to Indian Tamils in 1958, the
United National Party (UNP) seized the opportunity to rally support for Sinhalese nationalism
and regain seats in parliament. Bandaranaike then rescinded his agreement under pressure from
Buddhist nationalists, who were ultimately responsible for his murder, and his Sinhalese
constituents. Swaths of disappointed Tamils protested the revocation with peaceful civil
disobedience which inspired further anti-Tamil riots by the Sinhalese, leaving 12,000 Tamils
homeless and hundreds more dead (Bose 1994: 62).
The 1960s and 1970s saw the further decline of conditions for Tamils, with the
introduction of laws prohibiting the import ofTamil-language publications from India and
preventing Tamil students from returning to India to receive university education. A new
constitution was passed in 1972 which secured Sinhala as the nation's official language, offered
Buddhists a privileged status in society, and reinforced the national government's authority in the
legislative and executive branches, undermining federalism and thus further depriving Tamils of
political representation even within their local provinces. Small factions of disgruntled Tamils
once again resorted to peaceful protest, staging sit-ins at temples and public offices. Later that
year, Parliament introduced the Policy of Standardization and the District Quota System,
education policies which required Tamil students to achieve higher test scores than Sinhalese
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students in order to be admitted to university (Manogaran 1994: 212-13). These discriminatory
policies enraged young Tamils in Jaffua and other urban regions: the doors to prosperity had
been slowly creeping shut since independence was achieved, and these new laws effectively
slammed the last door in the face of millions of middle-class and moderately educated youths. A
tipping point had been reached for disheartened and downtrodden Tamils, both radicals as well
as the more moderate members ofthe Federal Party, who abandoned their goal of utilizing a
federal system to achieve equality and instead came to embrace Tamil Eelam. The Federal Party
joined with various other factions of Tamils to form the Tamil United Front (later the Tamil
United Liberation Front) and advocate a two-state solution to alleviate the discriminatory
practices ofthe Sri Lankan government (Wilson 1988: 88-9).
Despite rising unrest among Sri Lanka Tamils, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike
refused to relax discriminatory legislation. Simultaneously, militancy among Tamils began to
rise. Small pockets of armed resistance, comprised mainly of young male students, sprang up
across Sri Lanka throughout the 1970s, the first being the Tamil Students League, formed in
1970, followed by the Tamil Youth League (1973), the Tamil Liberation Organization (1974),
and, most notably, the Tamil New Tigers (1972) (Wilson 2000: 125). The Tamil New Tigers was
formed by 17-year old Jaffna native Velupillai Prabhakaran, who would lead the group of
revolutionaries for over thirty years until he was killed by military forces in 2009. Prabhakaran
began the TNT with just 15 other members (all male students in Jaffua), but the group quickly
expanded and morphed into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976. By this time,
Prabhakaran was already an established figure among both Tamils and Sinhalese for several
political acts, including his assassination ofthe Jaffna mayor, Alfred Durayappah, in 1975. The
assassination was in response to unprovoked police violence carried out against Tamils at the
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World Tamil Research Conference in Jaffna the previous year, which led to the death of nine
Tamils and severe injury to many others who were peacefully watching a speaker at the
conference (Wilson I 988: 130). Similar conflicts were becoming increasingly frequent
throughout Sri Lanka, rousing resentment among Tamils, who consequently increased the
intensity and frequency of their retaliatory efforts. The violence ofthe 1970s led to the passage
of the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act, which allowed for the arrest and detainment of
suspected terrorists for up to eighteen months without trial. This legislation remains in use today,
and is frequently used as a means to silence those seen as "undermining the unitary state," (Stone
20 14: 147). Of course, it is now obvious that the restrictive law failed to stifle Tamil efforts to
achieve autonomy: the LTIE expanded operations in the early 1980s in order to counter
persistent state-sponsored attacks.
The LTIE was not a large organization during its formative years-until 1983 it had a
constant membership of less than fifty resentful, young Tamil men-but, fostered by unrelenting
injustice, it soon became infamous both within Sri Lanka and throughout the world. 1977 saw
the first success of a Tamil party, the TULF, in Parliamentary elections; the group won
essentially all seats in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka. The party's platform was founded on the pursuit
of Tamil Eelam, thus their electoral success enraged many Sinhalese nationalists and spurred
more state-sponsored anti-Tamil riots, primarily in the country's northern region (DeVotta 2009:
1028). Sinhalese nationalist burned a Jaffua library in 1981, destroying tens of thousands of
books and historical materials. This was perceived as a particularly reprehensible affront by
Tamils against their history as well as a sign of the Sinhalese nationalists' true intentions: the
extermination ofTamils from the island. Such egregious violence caused a surge in support for
the LTTE, who began to plan more critical attacks oftheir own. In order to present a formidable
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challenge to the state, the LTTE believed it was necessary to threaten the apparatus of tyrannythe military. July

13th, 1983 was the first time the LTIE attacked members ofthe Sri Lankan

military-prior to this, attacks were primarily carried out against police forces or nationalist
groups. The LTTE ambushed an army patrol station near Jaftha, setting off a land mine that
killed 13 soldiers, thus enraging thousands of Sinhalese civilians (De Votta 2009: 1028). This
monumental attack spurred the "Black July" anti-Tamil riots that killed between 2,000 and 4,000
Tamils and displaced approximately 150,000 others (Bose 1994: 209). As thousands ofTamils
witnessed the systematic execution of their friends and family, they were inspired to take up
arms in the quest for Tamil Eelam. Creating a separate state for Tamils was seen as the only
realistic chance to prevent such atrocities in the future. The surge of support for Tamil Eelam
critically strengthened the LITE's forces, making it possible for them to retaliate and commit
offensive attacks against the state. Accordingly, this attack is seen as the beginning of the Sri
Lankan Civil War. Before assessing the events of the civil war, it is necessary to understand the
objectives of the LTIE-what did they hope to achieve through the use of strategic violence?

Understanding the L TTE:
The objectives of the LTTE were primarily established in accordance with the
convictions of the organization's leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. As such, considering
Prabhakaran's socioeconomic background and personal experiences allows us to garner an
understanding of why the LTIE believed the use of violence was necessary and legitimate.
Research has shown that these factors are useful indicators of an individual's propensity to
become involved in violent politics. Alexander Lee' s study of the Bengal anticolonial movement
in Who Becomes a Terrorist demonstrates that violent political actors are typically not of the
lowest socioeconomic status, as is frequently claimed by political scientists (Piazza 2006: 220).
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Rather, those most likely to be involved in political violence are "the poorest members of the
politically aware class," (Lee 2011: 242). Traditional theorists, such as Marx, also endorse this
theory, dubbing the lowest socioeconomic class the lumpenproletariat. Marx contends this class
of 'slum workers' is where the state often derives its legitimacy, as they are the most desperate
class and thus willing to concede to the state, whereas revolutionaries are members of the
working-class proletariat (Marx 1852: 67). On average, violent political actors are young
members of the lower-middle class cognizant of the injustices being committed against them.
They perceive violence as a viable means of alleviating oppression, and feel as though they have
relatively little to lose from using violence (Lee 2011: 214). A brieflook at Prabhakaran' s
upbringing speaks to the legitimacy of Lee's theory in the case ofthe LTTE.
Prabhakaran was born into the Karaiyar caste in 1954 on the northern coast ofthe Jaffna
Peninsula, a primarily Tamil region notorious for revolutionary movements even prior to Sri
Lankan independence (Bose 1994: 93). Members ofthe Karaiyar caste are considered lowermiddle class; many are fishermen, boat builders, or, more rarely, naval warriors. Prabhakaran
was formally educated in the Jaffna public system until the fifth standard, about ten years old
(Manogaran 1994: 172). His lower caste and relatively poor formal education made life among
affluent businessmen of Jaffna difficult. Unlike illiterate members of the lowest castes, he was
painfully aware of the opportunities denied to him yet widely available to others. As he grew
older, Prabhakaran witnessed the Sinhalese government systematically erode educational and
employment opportunities for Tamils. He came to resent both his Sinhalese oppressors as well as
Tamil members of higher castes, who subjugated and shunned members ofthe lower castes.
Simultaneously, Prabhakaran began to prescribe to Marxist/Leninist philosophies that were
spreading throughout Southeast Asia (Manogaran 1994: 173). Lenin's assertion that forceful
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secession from a despotic state is justified and, in some circumstances, morally mandated,
re:mnated with Prabhakaran and reinforced ancient claims to Tamil Eelam. At just seventeen
years old and heavily influenced by these newly discovered ideologies, Prabhakaran became
engrossed in the quest for Eelam and founded the Tamil New Tigers in hopes of liberating
Ternils of all castes from the Sinhalese majority (Bose 1994: 92). Angry, young, and poor, he
sought to revolutionize the Sri Lankan state. His idea of revolution, however, was bifurcated, and
so, too, were the ultimate objectives ofthe LTTE.
Prabhakaran, in accordance with his Marxist ethics, believed achieving Tamil Eelam was
necessary to provide both freedom from Sinhalese tyranny as well as an opportunity to create a
society absent of the caste system that had deprived him of education and affluence.
Accordingly, the LTTE's fundamental aim was not only to create a separate state for the Tamil
people, but one free of a hierarchical caste system. Ultimately, the latter goal distinguished the
LTIE from other Tamil groups: many advocates of Tamil Eelam did not support the idea of a
casteless society. This became an unremitting point of contention between Prabhakaran and the
TULF, as well as thousands of upper-caste Tamils who otherwise supported Eelam (Bose 1994:
104). Alienating swaths of Sri Lankan Tamils made Prabhakaran's struggle even more
challenging, but it was a point on which he was unwilling to concede. Prabhakaran insisted that
any Tamils circumventing the LTIE in an attempt to form a separate state were undermining the
LITE's efforts and inadvertently supporting the Sinhalese state. This conviction served as the
L TTE' s justification for systematically assassinating various Tamil leaders throughout the civil
war (Biziouras 2012: 554).
Similarly, Prabhakaran would accept nothing less than a two-state solution from the Sri
Lankan government. Thus, his commitment to Marxism was more limited than other radical

lee 19

Tamil groups, such as the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), whose
pursuit of socioeconomic equality surpassed their dedication to Tamil Eelam. The EPRLF and
similar groups sought to liberate the lowest caste Tamils and Sinhalese, which Prabhakaran
argued diluted the struggle of Tamils (Biziouras 2012: 555). Prabhakaran was resistant to
compromise of any kind in his pursuit of Ee/am, as exemplified by his condemnation of the
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, a peace agreement under which the Sri Lankan government agreed to
curtail the scope of federal power and instead adopt a provincial system that would allow Tamil
provinces some degree of autonomy (Bose 1994: 153). Prabhakaran vehemently purported that
"The only alternative to Tamil Ee/am is Tamil Eelam," nothing else would suffice (Manogaran
1994: 12).
Consequently, the LTIE was prepared to use any means necessary to establish Tamil
Eelam, as proven by nearly thirty years of relentless attacks against the state and even fellow
Tamils. While the attacks carried out by the LTTE were surely harrowing, they were executed in
good faith under the impression that little, if any, alternative existed to eliminate the suffering of
the Tamil people. Prabhakaran did not endorse violence simply for the sake of violence-but he
v,ras willing to use it to end the oppression of his people, stating, "The uncompromising stance of
Sinhala chauvinism has left us with no other option but an independent state for the people of
Tamil Eelam. We therefore ask the international community and the countries of the world that
respect justice to recognize our freedom struggle," (Prabhakaran 2006: 1). The LTTE believed in
the legitimacy of political violence because it was seen as their only option in their struggle for
freedom in near-genocidal conditions (Prabhakaran 2006: 2). Moreover, they believed their
historical right to their homeland superseded the dignity of life under oppression (Cruz 2009: 1).
Prabhakaran did not endorse terrorism and often spoke of the need for peace, purporting time and
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time again that "[The LTIE] are freedom fighters, not terrorists, seriously committed to peace,"
(Prabhakaran 2007: 1).
Thus, the LTIE did not engage in practices they did not believe to be conducive to
building Eelam: Prabhakaran prohibited wartime rape, as such acts did not advance the goals of
the organization (Hirsch 2013 : 2). Rather, women were valued as dignified fighters and often
joined the ranks of the LTTE. The organization functioned more like a military than a terrorist
operation, with a formidable naval wing (Sea Tigers) and air force (Air Tigers) fighting
alongside the traditional infantry and the suicide squadron, the Black Tigers. Training for
soldiers was intensive; the LTIE did not simply arm citizens and encourage them to
indiscriminately kill Sinhalese. In fact, Prabhakaran often spoke favorably of Sinhalese people,
stating the LTTE did not identify them as "opponents or enemies," nor did they intend to
"interfere in any way with the national life of the Sinhala people or with their freedom and
independence," (Eelam View 2013: 2). As such, their attacks were traditionally limited to
military, police officers, and politicians-armed representatives of the state or those advocating
and enabling the oppression of Tamils (Bose 1994: 153). Scrutinizing the nature of these attacks,
as well as the corresponding actions of the Sri Lankan state during the Civil War, helps to clarify
this challenging concept and understand conditions in post-civil war Sri Lanka.
A Generation of Conflict:
The riots of Black July, led primarily by the UNP, did not subside upon the end of the
month. Rather, as the state continued to suppress Tamils in an attempt to regain control of the
Northern and Eastern provinces, where the violence was worst, the conflict intensified. The
LTTE's membership soon surged to 50,000, and this vast increase in resources was used to
retaliate against the aggressive Sinhalese attacks, which were perceived as an attempt to
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permanently exterminate the Tamil ethnicity. Many Tamils now felt justified in using violence
against the military to fight for their liberation. Thus far, constitutional means had failed them:
The TULF, despite having sixteen representatives in parliament in 1983, had been unable to
improve conditions for Tamils since the party first gained seats in 1977 (Bose 1994: 209).
Rather, political conditions had deteriorated, and the L TTE purported that the TULF was
inhibiting progress for Tamils. In August 1983 the sixth amendment to the constitution was
passed, making it a crime to support any secessionist movement in Sri Lanka and establishing
severe penalties, including up to seven years imprisonment, for doing so (Art. 101 Amend 6).
Although ineffective at protecting Tamil interests, the TULF did support the goal of Tamil

Ee/am, making each member a criminal according to the new amendment. Thus, after failing to
repeal the amendment and refusing to give up their support of the Eelam movement, all sixteen
TULF members of parliament resigned in October 1983 (Biziouras 2012: 558). As such, the
LITE took matters into their own hands and began an aggressive program ofboth preemptive
and retaliatory attacks against the state. They quickly became the de facto leader of Sri Lankan
Tamils.
With the support ofthe Indian government early in the war, the LITE was able to gain
control of the Jaffua Peninsula. India provided weapons and training to members of the LTTE
and other Tamil militant groups from 1983-5, partially due to political pressure from Tamil Nadu
and Sri Lankan refuges (Wilson 1988: 182). However, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did
n0t publically support the use of widespread violence by Tamils or Sinhalese to realize their
political goals. She preferred to encourage negotiation and sponsored talks between the two sides
in hopes that a peaceful solution would be reached. Mrs. Gandhi sent a Tamil emissary, G.
Parthasarathy, to Colombo to negotiate with President Jayewardene, although the president was
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reluctant to concede to Tamil demands ("The Thimpu Talks" 3). By the end of the year,
"Annexure C," a precursor to the Thimpu Talks and the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, had been
drafted, which proposed devolving federal power to the provinces and thus allowing a fair degree
of autonomy for Tamils while still retaining a unified Sri Lanka. The proposal was considered at
the January 1984 All Parties Conference in Colombo, where it was rejected by Sinhalese
nationalists despite its potential to be widely accepted by secessionist Tamils. By the end of the
year, "Annexure C" had died and India had temporarily withdrawn formal attempts to resolve the
conflict, although they continued to covertly support the Tamil Eelam movement, often sending
weapons to LITE fighter in Jaffua.
Meanwhile, instead of promoting "Annexure C" to the UNP and other Sinhalese political
and religious parties, President Jayewardene had spent the early months on 1984 traveling
internationally to bolster support for his regime. He purported to the United States, Great Britain,
and China that the LTIE was little more than a terrorist organization presenting no legitimate
grievances and sought the assistance ofthese governments in defeating the LITE. Several
countries, including the China and Israel, sympathized with Jayewardene's pleas and did supply
fighter planes and artillery to the state (Bose 1994: 145). This reinforced Sinhalese confidence in
their ability to successfully defeat the LTIE and retain a unified Sri Lanka. As such, instead of
attempting to negotiate with Eelamists, the state increased their oppressive tactics. Jayewardene
instructed the military and regional authorities to cut food supplies and increase Sinhalese
settlements to Tamil regions . One such settlement in November 1984 led to the LITE's first
attack against Sinhalese civilians. The state attempted to forcefully remove over 13,000 Tamils
from their homes in Mana! Aru to make room for the Sinhalese and canceled two 99 year leases
with Tamil farmers, giving them just 48 hours to evacuate the property. Enraged by the absurdity
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of this request, the LITE killed approximately fifty ofthe settlers and three Sinhalese guards
("Sri Lanka Profile" 2014: 1). Sinhalese police officers, military men, and party nationalists were
enraged by the brutality of the LITE and retaliated in kind, targeting Tamil civilians and thus
provoking more violence by Tamils. Jaffna and nearby areas were becoming increasingly
dangerous for Tamils and Sinhalese alike. A vicious circle had begun with the riots of Black
July, and, over a year later, it still showed no indication of breaking.
As the LTIE increased their strategic attacks against the military, they expanded their
control of the Jaffna Peninsula to the south and east. The state responded to this increased threat
in kind as well as through nonviolent, political means: State sponsored newspapers, such as The
Island (Colombo) published articles engineered to inspire hatred towards Tamils and win
sympathy internationally. One such article, published at the end of 1984, asserted that Tamils
planned to issue a declaration of independence, formally separating Tamil Ee/am from Sri Lanka,
in the coming months. It is unknown where this claim originated, although it is widely believed
that it was engineered by the state ("The Thimpu Talks" 4). Needless to say, no declaration was
made by Tamils in the early months of 1985, as the paper had suggested. However, the damage
had already been done. The international community, notably Israel, took notice of the alleged
declaration and amplified support for the state, deeming the LITE a terrorist organization. The
struggle for Tamil Eelam was becoming increasingly difficult, especially after the assassination
ofPrime Minister Gandhi in 1984.
Gandhi's son, Rajiv Gandhi, took over the office of Prime Minister after his mother' s
death and was far more empathetic towards the Sri Lankan government. G. Parthasarathy's role
as a special emissary to Sri Lanka was revoked and he was replaced by Romesh Bhandari, who
was sent to Colombo as a foreign secretary for the India government. Bhandari received
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privileged treatment from Jayewardene, undermining his credibility with Tamils both in Sri
Lanka and Tamil Nadu ("The Thimpu Talks 4"). The international community took note of
India's more lax position towards the Sinhalese government and followed suit, with the United
States now selling arms to the Sri Lankan military. Although Bhandari's primary role was not to
encourage negotiations between Sinhalese and Tamils but instead to serve as a voice for India
within Sri Lanka, he was able to bring the two sides together for the 1985 Thimpu Talks. Prior to
the talks, violence had escalated on both sides of the conflict. The predominant Tamil
revolutionary groups, including the L TIE, had united as the Ee/am National Liberation Front to
combat state violence, although the unity was short-lived: the group disbanded after the
conclusion of the Thimpu Talks. The ENLF took their attacks outside ofTamil-controlled areas
fer the first time when they attacked Anuradhapura in May 1985, killing nearly 150 Sinhalese
residents ("The Thimpu Talks" 5). Fearing the ENLF would proceed further south, towards
Colombo, Jayewardene issued a ceasefire after extensive deliberation with Prime Minister
Gandhi. India then assumed responsibility for encouraging Tamil rebels to respect the ceasefire,
which consisted of four phases culminating in negotiations between the rebels and the state. The
first two phases lasted three weeks and called for the Sri Lankan government to suspend their
raids and resettlements ofTamillands and the de-escalation of violence by both sides. Phase III
mandated the restoration oflaw and order in the Northern and Eastern provinces and a mutual
respect for the ceasefire. Additionally, it granted amnesty to Tamil rebels currently in custody.
This laid the foundations for Phase IV, the Thimpu Talks in Bhutan. A report from the ENLF
was presented to the India government on the 18th of June stating the group's reservations
concerning certain provisions of the ceasefire agreement but ultimately agreeing to respect the
proposal (Seevaratnam 1989: 133-6). The ceasefire went into effect later that day.
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Although no resolution was reached during the Thimpu Talks, they remain significant:
By inviting the ENLF to participate, the state recognized for the first time the de facto leadership
of the LITE and other revolutionary Tamil groups (Bose 1994: 137). Yet, it is evident that
members of the ENLF did not see the talks as a legitimate opportunity to gain autonomy, as each
group sent second-tier leaders to the conference and did not expect the state to waiver in its
staunch opposition to a two state political solution. Instead, the talks were used by the various
members of the ENLF as an opportunity to publicize their cause. The ENLF iterated their four
"cardinal principles" ofthe Eelam movement at the talks: the recognition of Tamil as a
nationality, the acceptance of Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka as the Tamil homeland, the
recognition of the Tamil right to self-determination, and the restoration of citizenship and rights
to Indian (plantation) Tamils (Bose 1994: 138). The state was predictably unwilling to accept
these terms, resulting in the failure of the talks, which angered Gandhi and other officials in New
Delhi. They had hoped the Thimpu Talks would lead to some peaceful resolution between the
two sides, and instinctively blamed the LTTE when the talks failed. However, the Indian state
had failed to recognize the numerous ceasefire violations committed by Sinhalese nationalists
and military officers during the summer, including arson and murder of nearly two hundred
Tamil civilians in mid-July ("The Thimpu Talks" 7). In an impulsive move of frustration, India
ordered the LITE's representative in New Delhi to leave. Gandhi's support for Tamil
nationalists was waning. The failure of the talks allowed for two more years of relentless
violence by both sides, ultimately leading to yet another unsuccessful attempt by India to foster
peace, the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987.
In early 1987, Sri Lankan troops were able to contain LTIE cadres in Jaffna and
surrounding areas, but the violence still persisted. By this time, India had become exasperated
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with the conflict, which, as a regional superpower, they felt some obligation to mitigate. Despite
the previous failures of Indian intervention, in the summer of 1987, after just a few days of
private discussion, President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Gandhi signed the Indo-Sri Lanka
Peace Accord. The agreement was signed without the consent of the L TIE, who were
vehemently opposed to the closed door contract. The Accord, which was immediately
implemented, called for the Indian Peace Keeping Forces to be sent into Jaffna in an attempt to
maintain law and order, establish a ceasefire, and disarm LITE rebels in exchange for amnesty.
Additionally, the IPKF was to work with the government in order to establish the North-Eastern
Provincial Council, a semiautonomous governing body for the Tamil north (Bose 1994: 131).
Although the agreement seemed like a practical solution to the ethnic conflict, it neglected to
address any of the grievances presented by Tamils: it gave no heed to the four "cardinal
principles" expressed by ENLF at the Thimpu Talks and did not provide for the establishment of
a separate state for Tamils. It was therefore rejected by the LTIE and most Tamils, who felt
betrayed by the Indian government, which had previously supported their cause. It was only a
matter of months before the Accord began to crumble under its own weight.
The IPKF were immediately targeted by the L TTE, who refused to disarm, fearing
submission would breed further oppression. Tamils resented the presence of the Indian forces,
who understood neither the intensity nor the nuances of the situation they had been hastily
thrown into. The forces were incompetent and ill-prepared to accomplish the difficult task
assigned to them. Regrettably, it did not take long for the IPKF to earn their abhorrence among
Tamils. The troops joined with the Sinhalese military and began to commit atrocities against
Tamils in northern Sri Lanka-official figures indicate over 2,000 Tamil civilians and around
700 LITE fighters were killed by the IPKF between October 1987 and March 1990, when the
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forces were removed at the request of newly inaugurated President Premadase and the agreement
altogether abandoned by both sides (Bose 1994: 132). Moreover, thousands more civilians were
tortured or 'disappeared' during this time, including teachers, doctors, and journalists (Wilson
2000: 163). Thus, the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was futile in its efforts to end Sri Lanka's
internal strife. In fact, the agreement noticeably worsened the conflict it set out to resolve. The
damage was duplicative: rather than quell ethnic violence and pave the way for peace, the IndoSri Lanka Accord aggravated tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils and deepened
psychological perceptions of subjugation, depravation, distrust, and resentment among Tamils.
l11e IPKF's misconduct highlighted the unique struggle ofTamils and fortified claims to Eelam.
This revitalized LTIE forces and inspired them to continue the relentless path towards
autonomy. A fresh spark was ignited by the failure of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord which
carried LTIE forces into a new decade of war with renewed passion and vigor.
In 1990 alone, it is estimated that the LTIE was responsible for the death of over 1000
Sinhalese, mostly police officers or members ofthe military (Bose 1994: 210). During the
beginning ofthe decade, the LITE began to strategically increase its use of suicide bombings
and assassinations, targeting high-level political and military officials. Suicide bombings
minimized the chance of planned attacks being prevented by state intervention and demonstrated
devotion to the fight for Eelam, and assassinations hindered military operations and drew broad
attention to the LITE's cause, though much ofthat attention was negative. However, the LITE
determined that the forceful removal of incompliant leaders was necessary to bring about a more
favorable political climate. The 1991 assassination ofPrime Minister Gandhi utilized both
tactics. Gandhi was killed by an LTTE suicide bomber in Tamil Nadu during a campaign trip,
exacerbating the dissonance between the group and the Indian government (Manogaran 1994:
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12). The LTIE did formally apologize for the assassination, which was an act of revenge for the
brutality brought by the IPKF, but the government rejected this attempt at reconciliation.
Subsequently, Premadasa increased military presence in the north and east of the country,
amplifying efforts to regain control ofthe Jaffna peninsula. In July 1991, LTIE forces tried to
seize the Elephant Pass military base, which sat between Jaffua and the mainland. They
surrounded the base, where about 800 Sinhalese troops resided, for a month before government
reinforcements were able to force the LTIE to withdraw. The battle resulted in around 1000
deaths on each side (Wilson 2000: 162). The LTIE also continued to target high-level officials,
assassinating President Premadasa at a Mayday rally in 1993. Premadasa was succeeded by
Prime Minister Dingiri Wijetunga, who was in office for just over a year before Chandrika
Kumaratunga was elected in November 1994 (Wilson 2000: 167). During his brieftenure,
Wijetunga dismissed V. Prabhakaran's calls for peace talks, asserting that Tamils had presented
no legitimate grievances. Wijetunga, like his predecessor, emphasized to his constituents and the
international community that the Tamil plight was a problem of terrorism rather than systemic
historical oppression. As such, it required a military, not a diplomatic, solution. Just before
leaving office, Wijetunga sent a surge oftroops to the north to fight the LTTE, resulting in the
death of over 1,000 government troops (Bose 1994: 210-11).
Kumaratunga was more cautious militarily and willing to negotiate with Prabhakaran.
Upon entering office, she immediately promised Tamils and Sinhalese that she would draw the
war to a close, and peace talks with the LTIE began after the group announced a ceasefire in
1994. A brief respite from the perpetual violence ofthe past decade allowed the LTTE to begin
planning for institutions of governance in Jaffna beyond fundamental military operations. This
made the goal of Eelam seem considerably more tangible to Tamils. Administrative agencies and
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various border control posts were established in LITE-controlled areas (Stokke 2006: 1022).
Unfortunately, many government officials and Sinhalese border control agents failed to respect
the terms of the ceasefire, which lifted the embargo against many goods bound for the north.
LTIE forces warned Colombo that failure to respect the agreement would result in the
resumption of strategic violence, but they did not heed the warning. As such, the ceasefire ended
when LITE cadres attacked a Sri Lankan naval vessel in 1995. The remainder ofthe decade
came to be characterized by unremitting warfare which internally devastated Sri Lanka. Notable
events include an LITE bomb blast at an election rally in 1999, which wounded Kumaratunga,
and the July 2001 bombing of the Bandaranaike Airport, which was conjoined to an air force
base, by 14 LTrE members ("Sri Lanka Profile" 2014: 1).
Few other significant attacks were carried out during the early 2000s. The LTTE was
relatively successful militarily in gaining autonomy throughout the 1990s, allowing them to
expand the administrative agencies established during the 1994 ceasefire. They created the
Office of Planning and Development to facilitate the needs ofTamils as well as the Northeast
Secretariat on Human Rights and several other agencies to deal with traditional state functions
(Stokke 2006: 1033). This demonstrates a noticeable shift in focus from strategic violence to
politicization of Jaftha and other LTIE controlled areas in the early 2000s. It is generally
accepted that, by this time, the LTIE had successfully formed an infantile de facto state within
Sri Lanka, and they were formally acknowledged as the "sole representatives" of Tamils.
Moreover, the L TIE endorsed the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) as officially representing
Eelamists within the Sri Lankan government. Both the L TIE and the state were now willing to
work towards establishing a lasting reconciliation.
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In February 2002 the Norwegian government facilitated negotiations between the two
parties. A ceasefire was soon signed and peace talks commenced, taking place in Germany,
Norway, Thailand, and Japan from 2002-03 (Stokke 2006: 1022-23). The international nature of
the talks drew attention to the plight of Tamils and increased their possibility for success.
However, these talks were ultimately ineffective at permanently ending the war: In March 2003
the LTIE announced their withdrawal from negotiations, citing the state's reluctance to
implement settled provisions of the talks (Nadarajah 2005: 89). The ceasefire was still respected
by both sides for some time after the talks were terminated, with the LTIE encouraging the
government to remain willing to negotiate. In July 2004 an isolated suicide bombing in Colombo
carried out by an LTTE splinter group threatened the country's fragile stability, although it did
not lead to a widespread return to violence ("Sri Lanka Profile" 2014: 1). However, the war was
not yet over. In December 2005, the assassination of Tamil political leader Joseph
Pararajasingham at Christmas Eve mass indicated to Tamils that Sinhalese nationalists still
resented their presence in Sri Lanka ("Joseph Pararajasingham MP Shot Dead in Batticaloa
Church" 2005: 1). Moreover, the failure of the state to prevent Pararajasingham's murder or
prosecute the assassin, despite the presence of dozens of troops at the mass, renewed feelings of
inequality and subjugation. Consequently, the civil war was renewed in 2006.
The final three years of the war were notoriously some of the most ruthless on the state's
behalf. President Mahinda Rajapaska, elected in 2005, had promised to bring the prolonged
conflict to a close and aligned politically with the nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).
The JVP was vehemently against the 2002 peace process and had long resented Tamil
secessionists. Rajapaska conformed to a similar ideology, insisting the "Tamil problem" had to
be quelled militarily, despite the preceding four years of relative peace (Stone 2014: 148).
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Rajapaska quickly implemented covert military strikes against Tamils across the country,
although Colombo officially respected the ceasefire until 2008. The LITE, recognizing the
state's commitment to the extermination of Tamils, began to fight back once again. In 2007,
Rajapaska exiled thousands of Tamils from Colombo and, six months later, officially renounced
his commitment to the ceasefire. During this time, thousands of Tamil civilians were disappeared
or executed by the state ("Sri Lanka Profile" 2014: 1). In 2008, the state launched an
unprecedented program of violence against the LTIE and "all suspected militants" (mostly
civilians), particularly in predominantly Tamil regions. Simultaneously, Rajapaska was ensuring
his tenure and power in office, appointing hundreds of friends and family members to seats in the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches as well as the military and local police offices (Stone
2014: 148-9). Sri Lanka was now suffering not only from traditional civil war, but unparalleled
political corruption. However, under the guise of promoting security, Rajapaska was able to
persist unchecked.
The ruthless attacks promptly drew international attention to the conflict, with the United
Nations accusing both sides of war crimes as well as breaches in international human rights law
and calling for an immediate ceasefire (Stone 2014: 153). Rajapaska refused to comply with UN
requests and launched a military offensive into the north, enabling the capture of LITE
headquarters in Killnochchi in January 2009. The LTTE responded with desperate air strikes on
Colombo in a final attempt to critically weaken military forces, although their efforts proved
futile. Tamil strongholds fell to Sinhalese forces as they progressed through the north. In April
2009, LITE founder, V. Prabhakaran, was killed as troops raided the last LITE garrison ("Sri
Lanka Profile" 2014: 1). Remaining rebel cadres relinquished their arms in a devastating defeat,
and the Tamil National Alliance abandoned the quest for Eelam, instead endorsing a federal
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solution to the conflict. Under Rajapaska's despotic hand the civil war had come to a close.
Tamils mourned the loss of their leader and the return to a unitary, oppressive state, while
Sinhalese nationalists rejoiced in their victory. Yet the efforts of the LTIE were not in vain: they
had drawn international attention to their plight and prevented historically inevitable increases in
state subjugation, and perhaps even genocide.
The Aftermath of War:
Beyond the immediately apparent consequences of the Sri Lankan Civil War-loss of
life, Tamil diaspora, resource diversion, infrastructure destruction, and the economic cost of
rebuilding a fractured state--several more nuanced effects, both positive and negative, arose in
the aftennath of the conflict. Examining current political conditions in Sri Lanka reveals an
increasingly dictatorial regime focused largely on militarizing the Northern and Eastern
provinces and concentrating power in the federal government (Stone 2014: 150-4). Some
scholars, such as Neil DeVotta, contend that this development, although unjustified, is the result
ofthe war itself(DeVotta 2009: 1024). To some extent, this may be an accurate assessment,
(although the war alone is surely not responsible for Rajapaska's corruption) but such a
contention must be juxtaposed with the positive consequences of the war in order to fully
consider its merit. The outbreak of the war produced four clear benefits for Tamils:
1. It was preemptively effective at preventing further oppression of Tamils.
2. The LITE was able to draw international attention to the state's systematic
discrimination against Tamils, which had gone largely unnoticed by the international
community.
3. The de facto Tamil state proved the viability of Tamil Eelam, even if a legally recognized
two-state solution never came to fruition.
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4. The violence carried out by the LTIE gave Tamils some leverage to confront and barter
with the state when constitutional means and nonviolence had failed them.
After considering these key benefits, a case can be made for the legitimacy of the violence
utilized by the LTIE. This principle can then be expanded to apply to instances of political
violence more generally.
Prior to the evolution of the LTIE, Tamil people were essentially helpless against
increasing state oppression. Despite the presence ofthe TULF in parliament, the state was
unwilling to heed the concerns of Tamils. Rather, they continued to implement discriminatory
constitutional amendments and legislation. After carefully studying the conditions which led to
the war, it is clear that this trend of persecution showed no indication of ceasing. The Sri Lankan
government and Sinhalese nationalist parties were relentless in their efforts to expel Tamil
people from the island, and the TULF lacked legal recourse against such practices-they had no
grounds for negotiation with the Sinhalese-dominated parliament. The Sri Lankan state began
targeting Tamils almost immediately after gaining autonomy in 1948. Laws such as the Ceylon
Citizenship Act, the Sinhala Only Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution were implemented even with Tamil representation in parliament.
As tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils worsened, so did the legal repression ofTamils. It is
nearly certain, then, that such practices would have continued if the state was not met with a
formidable threat from Tamils. The LITE provided that threat. The outbreak of the war
prevented political conditions from worsening for nearly thirty years, as the state feared violent
recourse from the LTIE and thus avoided passing new laws during the war. Moreover, in an
effort to appease Tamils and appear amiable in international eyes, the state even reversed the
infamous Sinhala Only Act in 1987 when the 13th Amendment to the Constitution was passed,
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making both Sinhala and Tamil official languages and creating semiautonomous provincial
councils in an attempt to federalize the state (Art. 10 1 Amend 13).
Of course, that is not to say that Tamils did not suffer during the conflict: swaths of
civilians were tortured, raped, disappeared, and murdered by Sinhalese nationalists and troops,
but the resolve of the L TIE put a hold on the state' s legalization of subjugation. Additionally,
with international eyes drawn towards the conflict, the state was sure to avoid legitimizing the
grievances alleged by the LITE. The state needed to be portrayed as the victim ofunjust
terrorism to garner international support, which required engineering the faryade of fairness. This
benefit has outlasted the war: in the five years since the war's end the United Nations has called
for the investigation of suspected war crimes and violations in international human rights law
committed by the Sri Lankan government (Stone 2014: 153). Although Rajapaska has failed to
comply with these requests, he is aware that the world is carefully watching his actions. As such,
his attempts militarize the northern and eastern provinces have been hidden under the guise of
rebuilding infrastructure and restoring stability when in reality much of the north is thought to be
living under military occupation (Stone 2014: 150). While such clandestine operations are surely
reprehensible, the state has been careful to avoid the passage of blanket legislation targeting
Tamils utilized prior to the war, and political parties, such as the Tamil National Alliance, have
been successful in elections in the northern and eastern provinces. Unfortunately, Rajapaska has
subverted the legitimacy of provincial leaders with presidentially appointed governors, but
Tamils are now able to point to the Constitution for protection of their rights rather than as the
source of their oppression.
Despite staunch condemnation of the LTTE as little more than terrorist thugs, the war
forced the Sri Lankan government to recognize the LTIE as the legitimate representatives of Sri
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Lankan Tamils, as evidence by their involvement in the Thimpu Talks and subsequent
negotiations. This acceptance of the LTIE indicated that they were in fact more than a terrorist
organization-they were a group fighting for the equality of an oppressed minority. Similarly, as
the LTTE gained control ofthe northern and eastern provinces and began to function as quasiautonomous entities, the state was forced to recognize the viability of a two-state solution to the
conflict. The LTIE had created formidable military operations with naval and air units, and had
laid the foundations for several social institutions, including the OPD and NESHR. While these
institutions never surpassed infantile stages, had the LTIE been able to divert resources from
protecting their borders to cultivating civic growth it is likely that they would have expanded and
flourished. The state, then, could no longer denounce Tamil Eelam as an impractical delusion.
Tamil claims to Eelam were now historically grounded and contemporarily feasible. Although a
de jure two-state solution never materialized, the war had granted Tamils the chance to prove its

possibility for success.
One final benefit of political violence, although nuanced, is perhaps the most
significant-the empowerment factor. As previously mentioned, even with the presence of the
TULF in parliament, Tamils had no power to barter with the Sinhalese majority. Constitutional
means of drawing attention to their plight and achieving equality were in vain, and nonviolence
had failed them on several occasions: In June 1956, Tamils attempted to organize a sit-in at
parliament in protest to the Sinhala Only Act. They were told to move the protest to Galle Face
Green, just down the road from the parliament building and peacefully complied. Shortly after
moving the protest, mobs of Sinhalese nationalists erupted at the sit-in, in Gal-Oya, and in
Colombo, lasting for five days and resulting in the death of 150 Tamils (Wilson 2000: 84). Two
years later, after Bandaranaike's near-compromise with Tamils which would have created a
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federal solution to the conflict revolving around the Sinhala Only Act, Buddhist nationalists
rioted in protest, forcing Bandaranaike to renounce his support for the B-C Pact. The Tamil
Federal Party then planned to carry out nationwide non-violent protests, but these plans never
came to fruition, as Buddhists nationalists continued their riots, ultimately assassinating
Bandaranaike and killing nearly 300 Tamils (Bose 1994: 207). Peaceful Tamil protests against
the nationalization of schools in 1960-1 also resulted in violent riots from Sinhalese nationalists
and failed to convince parliamentary leaders to change course (Wilson 2000: 101). Moreover,
similar nationalist mobs erupted at the 1974 Tamil Culture Conference, ultimately killing nine
Tamils, and after the 1977 parliamentary success of the TULF, resulting in the murder of
hundreds ofTamils (Bose 1994: 208). Thus, when Tamils turned to violence it was an avenue of
last resort.
All of these nonviolent endeavors resulted in little more than the unpunished loss of life
fer Tamils, furthering their distrust of the Sinhalese state. When Tamils turned to violence, they
had already attempted, and failed, to succeed via peaceful and legal means. The state had refused
to rectify inequitable conditions for Tamils or prosecute their murderers, allowing wounds to
fester until inaction was no longer an option. Moreover, such intolerance from Sinhalese
nationalists strongly supported the Tamil contention that equality could only be achieved through

Eelam. Yet, to be successful in their attempts to obtain parity Tamils needed some sway over the
state. The violence of the LITE granted that necessary leverage to Tamils. For the first time, the
state was forced to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Tamil struggle because they had
something tc Jose-safety. Prior to the outbreak of the war, the government was unwilling to
heed the concerns of Tamils, Jet alone concede to their requests. The tables began to turn when
the LTIE proved they were willing to employ any means necessary to achieve justice for Tamils.
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Systemic discrimination would no longer go unpunished or unnoticed-if the state wished for
peace they would have to be willing to compromise or fear reprisal from the oppressed.
Thus, genuine negotiations between the two sides were able to take place. Although such
negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, some legislative victories, such as the passage of the
131!: Amendment in 1987, did take place during the war. Of course, the state's willingness to
recognize the LTIE as legitimate leaders of island Tamils, and the temporary existence of a de
facto Tamil state are surely independent Tamil triumphs that can be attributed to the violence

utilized by the LTIE. Furthermore, without this violence, it is likely that current conditions for
Sri Lankan Tamils would be far worse, and the international community would be largely
ignorant to the plight of Tamils. That is not to say that current political conditions on the island
are acceptable: they are not, but, predictably, they are better than they would have been if the
pogrom against Tamils had not been interrupted by political violence. After reviewing current
political conditions in Sri Lanka, a case can be made for the legitimacy of political violence more
generally.
Immediately following the war's end, the Rajapaska regime was told by the United
States, Great Britain, India, and the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights to
decentralize power from the federal government to provincial councils, open investigations into
suspected war crimes (such as government forces knowingly firing into no-fire zones full of
civilians), and attempt to reconcile the grievances presented by Tamils, yet, five years later, they
have still failed to do so (Stone 2014: 149). Rajapaska did create the Lessons Learnt and
Reconciliation Commission to achieve these ends, but attempts to re-democratize the country
and empower Tamils have been largely superficial. While much infrastructure in Northern
provinces has been rebuilt, this restoration has served to allow the state to seize public and
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private lands in the north and east while simultaneously subjecting the region to a heavy military
presence and the state-mandated creation of Sinhalese settlements. Such a Sinhalese presence
serves to abolish claims to a Tamil homeland and skew provincial votes in favor of Sinhalese
candidates (Stone 2014: 150-3). While conditions are worst in primarily Tamil regions, the entire
island is subject to Rajapaska's despotism. The passage of the Eighteenth Amendment in 2010,
which removed presidential term limits, and the regime's continued reliance on the draconian
Prevention of Terrorism Act to surveil, arrest, and detain citizens has provoked concern among
Sinhalese citizens as well. Amnesty International called for the abolition of this law in 2011, but
it is still in use (Sri Lanka Human Rights Report 2011: 1). Moreover, Rajapaska' s restructuring
of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches has essentially nullified the power of
provincially elected leaders, which is primarily where the Tamil National Alliance has seen
success. Under Rajapaska, legislation has been passed subjecting provincial councils to oversight
from presidentially appointed governors and only granting the councils control over federally
appropriated lands (Stone 2014: 156). The regime has also been condemned by UN Human
Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay and Amnesty International for the disappearances, executions,
and detention of journalists and ordinary citizens, including a handful of Sinhalese activists (Sri

Lanka Human Rights Report 2011 : 1). In March 2014, after the passage of numerous UN
resolutions, an international body was established to investigate the suspected war crimes, but in
August Rajapaska announced the body would be denied entry into the country ("Sri Lanka
Profile" 2014: 1).
Undoubtedly, conditions in Sri Lanka are less than desirable for both Tamils and
Sinhalese. However, it is unlikely that widespread violence and discrimination against Tamils
will be perpetrated with impunity as it was prior to the war. With recent history proving the
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willingness of Tamils, and human beings in general, to fight for their fair treatment, Rajapaska
would be wise to take heed oftheir grievances before violence becomes necessary. Moreover,
the international community has a watchful eye on Sri Lanka. Rajapaska must tread lightly in the
area of human rights if he wishes to avoid international sanctioning and intervention. In the case
of the Sri Lankan Civil War, violence was able to prevent further oppression of Tamils, draw
international attention to their cause, prove the viability of their proposed solution to the conflict,
and provide influence to a previously ineffectual group, thus paving the way for peaceful,
constitutional means to succeed. Accordingly, it can be said that the violence carried out by the
LTIE was justified consequentially given the conditions which caused the LTIE to form, and
legitimate given its ends, as it was able to prevent the further oppression of Tamils and pave the
way for nonviolence to succeed. Of course, these claims have thus far relied only on empirical
evidence-they must now be theoretically endorsed.
Theoretical Defenses of Violence:
Given this in-depth examination ofthe Sri Lankan Civil War, several specific conditions
have been established under which political violence can be first justified and subsequently
legitimized. The violence carried out by the LTIE was justified in that Tamils had valid
reasoning behind their attacks-they were under significant oppression-and legitimate because
the violence prevented and, to some degree, alleviated this oppression-the state's increasing
subjugation of Tamils showed no indication of ceasing prior to the outbreak of the war.
Moreover, it has been established that nonviolent protest and constitutional means were
attempted and unsuccessful. Thus, Tamils utilized violence as a last resort when their grievances
presented a formidable threat to the life and liberty of an entire ethnicity. In general, then, it can
be concluded that violence is justified when it is carried out as a defense of last resort to some
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form of significant oppression and legitimate when it presents the opportunity to mitigate such
oppression. In this case, "significant oppression" should be understood as clear and imminent
th:eat to one 's life or liberty. It is important to note that the justification of political violence is to
some degree reliant on one's subjective moral framework, meaning to some, particularly
deontologists, violence of any kind may never be morally justified. While it can be claimed that
such unwavering opposition to violence under any circumstance may actually be immoral, that is
a subject beyond the scope of this work (Chomsky 1967: 1). This work assumes a pragmatic
approach to justifying violence, thus allowing legitimacy to be theoretically demonstrated using
just war theory and theories presented by various political theorists including Noam Chomsky
and Conor Cruise O'Brien.
Historical just war theory, first conceived by St. Thomas Aquinas, relies largely on six
key principles which, in conjunction, justify the choice to go to war (jus ad bellum): just cause,
being a last resort, possessing just intention, reasonable chance of success, ends proportional to
means, and possessing the proper authority to initiate such conduct (Moseley 1). If violent
warfare by the state can be justified under such circumstances, it should be that political violence
against an oppressive state is equally justified under these conditions. Political violence by nonstate actors can easily satisfy the first five conditions. Just cause is present when an imminent
threat to the life or liberty of innocents is readily apparent. Being an option of last resort requires
that nonviolent or legal means have systemically failed to eliminate this threat, and just intention
means the violence is truly being used to eliminate this imminent threat. While it is sometimes
difficult to identify ulterior motives of both state and non-state actors, the reasonability of
success can typically clarify whether or not just intention exists: if the violence is unlikely to be
successful yet still used there is often an ulterior motive present. Thus, it is necessary that the
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violence is reasonably likely to eliminate the present threat and will not be carried out in vain. Of
course, it is necessary that the means (violence) are proportional to the intended ends
(eliminating the imminent threat): If violence is not used, the feared outcome must be bad
enough to justify violence (Mosely 1).
The issue that arises when this claim is made is the final element of just war theory,
proper authority. Traditionally, Max Weber's belief that the state possesses a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force is used to assert that the state is the only entity possessing right authority
to initiate warfare. However, this belief is contingent upon consent of the governed derived via
Hobbes' Social Contract Theory. Absent of that consent, Weber' s contention lacks justification,
thus allowing bodies outside of the state to justify the initiation of political violence. Surely,
oppressed citizens do not consent to their oppression. It is this oppression which revokes the
state's right authority to initiate violence and instead offers it to the oppressed. O'Brien supports
and broadens this claim in asserting that there is a distinct difference in violence used to counter
state subjugation and obtain freedom as opposed to violence utilized by the state to further or
maintain such subjugation (Chomsky 1967: 2). The international community has come to accept
the legitimacy ofjust war via the United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the Charter protects a
country's right to engage in defensive and even preventive warfare in order to protect their lands
and citizens (United Nations 1945: 10-11). Thus, political violence carried out by non-state
actors, such as the LTIE, can be carried out in accordance with international norms as well as
each independent principle of just war theory ifwe are willing to accept a more expansive
understanding which allows the transference of right authority from the oppressors to the
oppressed.

lee 42

Once the right to go to war has been established, parties are expected to conform to the
principles ofjus in bello, or law during war. Following these principles is required for violence
by both state and non-state to remain justified throughout the conflict. Conduct in war is said to
be justified if actors distinguish between civilians and combatants, respond proportionately to
attacks, treat prisoners of war fairly, and only conduct attacks believed to benefit their causethat is, actors will not commit acts deemed malum in se, or inherently evil, such as rape (Mosely
2). If such principles are followed, actors are not responsible for unintended consequences of the
violence. Surely, there is equal opportunity for both state and non-state actors to meet these
requirements. Indeed, during the civil war, the LTIE primarily targeted police officers, military,
and Sri Lankan officials. While they did occasionally intentionally target civilians, this was only
used in response to the murder of Tamil civilians by the state or Sinhalese nationalists. The
means utilized by the LTTE were on par with those used by the state, and Prabhakaran
condemned rape, saying it was not conducive to founding and equal Tamil state or defeating Sri
Lankan forces, who often raped Tamil women (Hirsh 2013: 1). The LTTE recognized the
importance of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate uses of violence, and strictly
utilized the former.
Beyond the very fundamental just war theory, several other contentions can be made to
eadorse political violence. Even those morally opposed to harming others would find it difficult
to support the claim that violence can never be morally justified. There are undoubtedly
circumstances where using violence to harm some individuals would prevent much more harm
from occurring to others, thus making violence seem morally required. An obvious example
would be the murder of Adolf Hitler, which could have prevented vast suffering of innocents. A
devoted deontologist would certainly find it difficult to refute such a case. Indeed, even many
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pacifist Indian Hindus carne to endorse violence against their colonizers, as expressed by
journalist Ta!"aknath Das:
" ... the more [the British] t}Tannize over a helpless and unarmed people, the more
terrorism will grow. We may deprecate terrorism as outlandish and foreign to our
culture, but it is inevitable as long as this tyranny continues, for it is not the
terrorists that are to be blamed, but the tyrants who are responsible for it. It is the
only resource for a helpless and unarmed people when brought to the verge of
despair. It is never criminal on their part. The crime lies with the tyrant,"
(Goldman 1917: 2).
Accordingly, Chomsky contends that the elimination of a "still greater evil" is a requirement for
political violence to be legitimate (Chomsky 1967: 1). Such a moral requirement seems easy to
satisfy when juxtaposed with Das' convictions and O'Brien's claim of increased legitimacy
when violence is enacted to resist oppression: both speak to the elimination of a greater evil. Of
course, there are often various unforeseen consequences to political violence, such as the loss of
civilian lives or the environmental degradation, that make it difficult to precisely assess costs and
benefits. Although the possibility of such costs should not altogether prevent the use of violence
in otherwise justified instances, due care should be exercised to minimize these costs. For
example, if adversaries are occupying civilian homes, attacks should be withheld or redirected
towards infrastructure. Again, this is consistent with just war theory, which absolves parties of
responsibility for unintended consequences of violence as long as their actions were consistent
with bothjus ad bellum and jus in bello (Mosely 1).
Surely, a pragmatic foundation for determining the legitimacy of political violence has
been established via just war theory and is generally accepted in the international community.
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The sole element which separates the violence carried out by the LTTE and other non-state
actors from legitimate wars between states would be just authority. However, it is clear that
under oppressive conditions the state forfeits its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, thus
allowing non-state actors to legitimately use violence against their oppressors in order to end
their suffering. This theory does not conflict with just war theory and is consistent with Chomsky
and O'Brien's requirements for the justification of violence. So, political violence is justified
when it is carried out as a defense of last resort to some form of significant oppression and
legitimate when it presents the opportunity to mitigate such oppression. Such acts of violence
should not be deemed terrorism, which frequently targets civilians and is typically carried out by
groups presenting no legitimate grievances against the state.
Additional Potential Benefits of Violence:

While the preceding theories have largely revolved around specific instances required to
legitimize violence, political violence may also present several benefits beyond those seen in the
Sri Lankan Civil War, speaking further to its legitimacy. This work does not seek to empirically
explore each possible advantage. Admittedly, these claims require a more in depth analysis than
what is provided here. However, a brief review ofthe most popular contentions adds yet another
dimension to the justification and legitimacy of political violence, which helps to dissolve the
taboo surrounding such acts. Arguments presented by Youseff Cohen, Barrington Moore,
William O'Brien, and Noam Chomsky offer distinct claims speaking to the ability of violence to
provide both statewide and individual benefits, including the creation of stable and democratic
societies. Further research and empirical studies could help substantiate these claims, notably
those presented by O'Brien and Chomsky. It is necessary to give due weight to the potential for
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such benefits to arise when considering just war theory, particularly the need for proportionality
between grievances and the potential relief political violence would provide.
Y ouseff Cohen's study addresses the role of collective violence in the process of statebuilding, ultimately finding that violence is imperative to the creation of a cohesive and powerful
state. Cohen's empirical analysis uses tax ratio to measure the power of a given state and finds
that violence has historically allowed for state expansion and increases in power (Cohen 1981:
906). This measure ensures that Cohen is not simply assessing the brute force capabilities
possessed by the state, but rather the existence of political order. Thus, the presence of political
violence has come to indicate a move towards stability within a state rather than decay, as
traditionally believed (Cohen 1981: 909). Such findings are especially relevant in instances of
civil war, where the objective of one side is often the creation of a new state. Violence carried
out during the war may be essential to founding a new state with stable institutions: Cohen has
proven that violence particularly aids in the evolution of infantile states (Cohen 1981: 905).
However, Cohen's study does not measure the presence of inherently valuable qualities in a
state, such as freedom or liberty. Barrington Moore does more closely examine the relationship
between political violence and the expansion of individual freedoms, finding the later to be
largely dependent on the former.
In Social Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy, Moore claims that violent revolution is

not merely legitimate but in fact necessary for the expansion of freedom and the prevention of
tyrannical rule (Wiener 1975: 301). Moore's analysis examines the conditions surrounding the
development of communist, fascist, and democratic regimes as they evolve into modern societies
and finds that violent revolution has been a necessary factor in the cultivation of democratic
regimes. Successful violent "Bourgeois revolutions" have prevented communism and fascism
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from taking hold of societies, such as England, France, and the United States, allowing instead
for democracy to flourish . Contrarily, the failure or absence of such revolutions, in countries
such as Japan and Germany prior to World War II, permitted dictatorial fascism to succeed
(Wiener 1975: 303-5). Moore does not say that the absence of violent revolutions will always
lead to such extreme forms of despotism, but indeed some sort of authoritarianism will be
established. Democracies are surely better able to foster individual freedom and liberty than such
regimes. Although Moore surely garnered his fair share of critics, just one, Lawrence Stone,
objected to the theory that violence was necessary for democracy to thrive (Weiner 1975: 315).
Stone's issue with this facet of Moore's theory was based largely on subjective moral judgments
on the justification of political violence. Overall, Moore's study, when coupled with Cohen's
analysis, provides a strong case for the ability of violence to enable the growth of free, strong,
and stable states.
While these studies have focused largely on pragmatic analysis, numerous subjective
claims have been made regarding the benefits of violence, including Irish politician William
O'Brien' s assertion that violence is essential to ensure the voice of moderation is heard (Cruise
1969: 1). This is frequently purported by environmental extremists engaging in ' ecotage'· tactics,
such as Dave Foreman, and even American Republicans in reference to members of the "Tea
Party." It is somewhat difficult to point towards violence as the sole factor in motivating a state
to adopt a more moderate policy. However, there are certainly identifiable instances in which
states have come to embrace more judicious positions after some radical act of violence. In the
Sri Lankan Civil War, the actions of the LTIE forced the state to approach the bargaining table
on several occasions and even led to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, repealing the
Sinhala Only Act (Art. 101 Amend 13). Thus, violence can convince the state to reassess their
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options and ultimately embrace more reasonable and just policies, as it offers leverage to the
oppressed and makes the demands of well-behaved moderates seem more reasonable.
Lastly, we will consider the role of violence in liberating the oppressed from
psychological positions of inferiority. Chomsky, when examining the role of peasants as
members of the VietCong during the American invasion of Vietnam, finds that violence was
able to "break the bonds of passivity that made them totally incapable of political action,"
although he believes that nonviolence can achieve the same results (Chomsky 1967: 1).
However, Chomsky admits that his beliefin the abilities of nonviolence is based purely on
faith-he is able to find no examples of nonviolence achieving this same end. Malcolm X has
traditionally made the opposite claim, insisting the nonviolence had failed to enable African
Americans to realize their full potential and insisting that we cannot teach the oppressed to
accept brutality (X 1964: 1). X concludes that in the absence ofviolence, minorities will believe
their subjugation is due to some element inherent in their character. This argument is
undoubtedly difficult to prove, yet instances such as the Vietnam War speak to its legitimacy.
The leverage-the ability to demand from your oppressors that they end their brutalitiesprovided by political violence may very well psychologically elevate the downtrodden. If this is
the case, this is an incredibly powerful benefit of political violence that would have longstanding
implications for post-revolutionary societies.
Conclusion:
The struggle for Tamil Eelam was carried out by men and women under significant
cppression who had witnessed the failure of nonviolent and constitutional means to gain peace.
Unwilling to accept their inequitable and grossly oppressive treatment, the LTTE came to
embrace their last option for peaceful equality-violence. The LTTE were surely not committing
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indiscriminate acts of terrorism, but rather selectively targeting the sources of their subjugation.
Fighting for what they believed to be a just cause-equality and self-determination-with the
ultimate goal of a peaceful, two-state coexistence with the Sinhalese, the LTIE became the
legitimate leaders of Sri Lankan Tamils for nearly thirty years. Tamils turned to violence as a last
resort after decades of subjugation, at least partially the result of European colonialism, by the
Sinhalese state and were able to draw international attention to their plight, prove the viability of

Tamil Eelam, and prevent their further oppression. Moreover, the violence utilized by the LTIE
forced the state to earnestly consider the needs of Tamils for the first time, as they now had
something to lose--safety.
Despite these grievances and the subsequent relief political violence was able to provide,
the L TIE is frequently deemed a heinous band of terrorists rather than a venerable organization
of freedom fighters. Such condemnation can be attributed to the failure of modern political
s;ientists to carefully consider the circumstances surrounding and potential benefits of political
violence. This hasty dismissal of violence as immoral taboo has systemically undermined the
legitimacy of the grievances presented by groups participating in violence. DeVotta contends
that the violence ofthe LITE damaged the legitimacy oftheir claims to oppression, leading to
their failure to realize Eelam (DeVotta 2009: 1021). Yet the atrocities committed against Tamils
prior to the use of violence by Tamils were not altered because the LITE chose to respond with
violence-they remained just as dreadful and, accordingly, just as legitimate. So it appears the
problem is not with the use of violence by the oppressed-it does nothing to alter the character
of their grievances-but rather with how we perceive such grievances after violence is used. Our
tendency to stand morally askance to all types of violence has resulted in an unfair condemnation
of oppressed peoples resorting to political violence in attempts to obtain autonomy. This
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predisposition is ultimately harmful to those living under suppression. Thus, responsibility falls
on us to reconsider such brash denunciation of political violence and rather study it in context.
Even if certain instances of violence are found to be unjustified or illegitimate, that cannot lead
us to discredit the grievances presented by those engaging in violence.
Surely, the LTTE carried out many atrocious acts ofviolence, but they were presented
with no other option to secure their own right to life, as is often the case in such conflicts. Thus,
their tactics were both justified and legitimate: violence can be said to be justified when it is
carried out as a defense of last resort to some form of significant oppression and legitimate when

it presents the opportunity to mitigate such oppression. This principle is consistent with just war
theory if we are willing to reconsider the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of violence
under certain conditions, namely when that state has broken the social contract. Moreover,
political violence can often be consequentially justified when the strategic targeting of
oppressive leaders eliminates the future suffering of innocents. Admittedly, certain factions of
deontology will never allow for the justification of violence of any kind: while it may be possible
to argue against such moral frameworks, it is beyond the scope of this work. Surely, there are
other benefits to the use of political violence, such as the creation of a stable and just society, as
asserted by Cohen and Moore, and it is recommended that these benefits be further explored in
order to be given due consideration when considering the need for proportionality between
violent means and the potential relief such means provide.
The year is 2014, and while Americans encourage their government to take military
action against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the Sinhalese army stealthily encroaches upon
northern Tamil regions, careful not to draw international attention to their invasion of the Tamil
homeland. While hundreds of thousands of Americans protest police brutality against minorities,
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thousands of Tamil journalists and politically active citizens "disappear" or cautiously seek
asylum from the Rajapaksa regime. While the United States and European Union stands in
defense of Ukraine's right to self-determination, factions ofbrave Tamils stand in remembrance
ofthe atrocities of Black July, still demanding Tamil Eelam in the wake ofthirty years of
fighting. It seems, then, that while the international community stands in defense of the rights of
threatened and oppressed peoples to equality and self-determination, we frequently fail to apply
such principles when violence is utilized, especially by unfamiliar entities. Rather than offer due
consideration to the circumstantial justifications of political violence, we have engaged in a
rhetoric that discredits the rights of groups engaging in violence as a defensive measure of last
resort and fails to consider the potential relief political violence may offer. The struggle of Sri
Lankan Tamils offers a microcosmic example of the harm that can result from such practices.
Had the international community sooner recognized the grievances presented by Tamils and thus
the need for political violence, it is likely that the war may have ended with a permanent, twostate solution. While conditions for Tamils are surely better than they would have been if the war
had not occurred, they are far from ideal. Thus, the international community should stand in
unison with the United Nations in addressing the alleged war crimes committed by the state and
defend the Tamil right to self-determination-Eelam may offer the only opportunity for peace
within Sri Lanka.
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